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Temporary contracts and young women in 
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Abstract: 
 
In this paper we analyse the determinants of temporary employment through a 
balanced panel of workers from 1995 to 2000. Firstly, we estimate a panel with 
1267 individuals with ages ranging from 16 to 65 years. We obtain that the 
probability of having a temporary contract increases for people younger than 46 
years old. Secondly, we estimate separately the sample of people younger than 46 
years old and we obtain that the probability of temporality increases for young 
people with university level of education. More interestedly, the probability of 
being in a temporary contract is smaller for young women that for young men in 
Spain. 
 
KEYWORDS: labour market, gender, temporary contract, permanent contract 
and panel data 
JEL: J21 and J29 
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1. Introduction 
 
The persistence of the Spanish unemployment spurred, in 1984, the 
implementation of a major reform package to enhance labour market flexibility 
and to help entrance to the labour market1. One of the most labour market 
innovations was the modification of temporary contracts that allow firms to hire 
employees performing regular activities. Before this, permanent work contracts 
represented 90% of all contracts, with the remaining temporary contracts being 
mainly of seasonal nature. These contracts became attractive to employers 
because of both, their short duration and low severance payment. Consequently, 
from these greater incentives, the new temporary contracts immediately enjoyed a 
degree of success that far exceeded expectations.  
The difference in severance payments between temporary and permanent 
contracts is a key for understanding its success (see Dolado et al, 2002). The 
number of temporary contracts was disproportional after the reform of 1984. In 
1994, 1997 and 2001 took place new reforms, trying to achieve a more balanced 
situation by restricting the use of temporary contracts and by reducing mandatory 
firing costs under new permanent contracts. Afterwards, these reforms were not 
effective to reduce the rate of temporality that still remains around the level of 
30%.  
 
1 For a deeply analysis of the legal framework of Spanish’ temporary employment growth see 
Amuedo-Dorantes (2001); Dolado et al (2002) and Segura (2001). 
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3
Several studies carried out for the Spanish case show that the average 
productivity of temporary workers is lower than that of permanent ones. For 
instance, Sánchez and Toharia (2000) find evidence in favour of this hypothesis. 
This evidence is explained by the negative effect over the worker’s effort caused 
by differences in wages. In addition, Diaz and Sánchez (2004) obtain, through a 
stochastic frontier analysis, that the high percentage of temporary contracts has 
affected negatively productivity. Thurow’s (1975) model of job competition 
assumes that productivity is associated to jobs, not to workers. There are jobs with 
higher productivity than others, and firms allocate workers to jobs according to 
their educational profile. As employers rarely have direct evidence of the specific 
training costs for specific workers, they end up by ranking workers according to 
their educational attainment. In this sense, if job productivity is related with jobs 
as well as workers, in Spain the high augment of “bad jobs” could explain the 
negative effects in productivity. Also, Rodríguez-Gutierrez (2006) identifies the 
main determinants of the proportion of temporary workers at firms and show that 
this proportion has a countercyclical behaviour. 
We built a balanced panel of 1267 workers from 16 to 65 years old to 
estimate a random effect probit model to analyse the determinants of the 
temporality in Spain. We obtain that temporality increases for employees younger 
than 46 years old. Given that temporality affects, over all, people younger than 46 
years old we estimate separately two balanced panel of individuals, one for people 
younger of 46 and other for people older than 45 years old.  We have found 
significant differences between those groups in gender, in education and in sectors 
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of activity. To be a woman younger than 46 reduces the probability of 
temporality. This result is related with the sample selection imposed to obtain a 
group of people that works six years without any unemployment spell. It is more 
difficult for women than for men to persist in employment given the women’s 
higher unemployment rate. Therefore, we can say that the young women of our 
sample have strongly succeeded in the labour market. Other interesting result is 
that young people with university level of education increases the probability of 
temporality. As we will show later, this result could be explained by the fact that 
during this period most new contracts were temporal. This new contract 
framework has affected young workers that face different labour market 
legislation than that found by people who arrived to the labour market before 
1984. Firstly, because they faced a labour market with a job creation focused 
mainly in temporary contracts and secondly, because the labour market reform of 
1997 introduced a new permanent contract with lower firing cost and one of the 
target groups were workers older than 45 years old. Therefore, it explains our 
findings that workers under 45 have a higher incidence of temporary work. The 
Spanish legal framework, after the labour market reforms, have developed a broad 
set of rules promoting permanent contracts as, for example, the existence of legal 
restriction to the excessive renewing of temporary contracts for the same workers, 
and some economic incentives to convert temporary contracts in permanent ones. 
Even though the existence of a legal constraint2, in our sample, the average 
number of years with the same employer for temporary workers exceed the three 
 
2 It is not allowed to renew a temporary contract to the same worker after three years. 
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years allowed by law, showing that the Spanish firms have been making other 
arrangements with workers to avoid legal constraints.  
The paper is organised as follows: In section 2, we show the data and 
variables. Section 3 provides the discussion of results. Finally, in section 4 we 
present the concluding remarks.  
2. Data and Variables 
 
Data from the ECPH for Spain, conducted by the Spanish National 
Institute of Statistics (INE), is used to estimate three random effect Probit models 
to investigate the determinants of temporary work. We analyse a balanced panel 
of 1267 wage earners currently working 15 or more hours per week, from 1995 to 
2000. This is a sample of people, which are employed during the six years of 
analysis. In the ECPH survey there are a number of questions (PE001A, PE002A, 
PE011, PI211M, PU001, and PU002) that allow us to discriminate between 
workers that have experienced some unemployment spell and those that have been 
working six years without interruption. Firstly, through variables of activity, and 
secondly, checking that individuals have obtained a monthly wage without 
interruption in this period.  
The percentage of temporary workers in 1995 was of 23.8% while in 2000 
it diminished until 10.4%. From these 1267 individuals we have 275 women, 
which represent the 21.7%. We have made this sample selection because we are 
interested in analysing the determinants of people that remain in temporary jobs 
even though they are working enough time to be in a permanent position. Table 1, 
shows the share of temporary and permanent workers included in the sample. 
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From 1995 to 2000, 170 temporary workers have obtained a permanent contract, 
while 132 workers remain in a temporary contract. The 75% of these 132 
temporary workers have seniority with their employers from 5 to 9 years while the 
21.5% have seniority higher than 10 years. From this results we infer how 
difficult is to understand the concept of temporality in Spain.  
When we restrict the sample to those individuals younger than 46 years 
old, the percentage of temporary workers rise to 30% in 1995 while in 2000 the 
percentage diminished until 11.4%; both percentages are higher than that obtained 
for the whole sample. The younger have a high proportion of temporality. Here 
we have 159 women and 552 men; then women represent the 22.36% of the 
sample.  
 
Analysing the distribution of education by type of contract the sample 
shows that the 27.6% of permanent workers had university level in 1995 while 
TABLE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT WORKERS BY 
YEARS 
YEARS TEMPORARY PERMANENT TOTAL 
Whole Young Whole Young Whole Young 
1995 302 213 965 498 1267 711 
1996 262 175 1005 536 1267 711 
1997 218 140 1049 571 1267 711 
1998 192 119 1075 592 1267 711 
1999 134 84 1133 627 1267 711 
2000 132 81 1135 630 1267 711 
Page 6 of 24
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
7
this percentage diminished until the 25.4% in 2000. From 1995 to 2000, one 
hundred and seventy temporary workers became permanent. The 14.1% came 
from primary education, 44.7% from first level of secondary education3, 28.2% 
from second level of secondary education and 12.9% from university level. The 
percentage of people with university education that became permanent is smaller 
than that obtained in other levels of education. 
 When we analyse the distribution of temporary and permanent workers by 
education for the restricted sample of individuals younger than 46 years old, we 
obtain that the percentage of workers with university level in 1995 rise to 26.5% 
while in 2000 it was of 24.9%. Along the period, the percentage of university 
studies in permanent contracts was smaller than that of the whole sample analysed 
above.  
 Concerning the distribution of education between men and women for 
workers younger than 46 years old, we obtain that 40.25% of women have a 
university level of education while only the 18.12% of men have this level. The 
condition of been during six years in a job, is strong r for women than for men, 
given the existence of gender discrimination in the labour market. Thus, we infer 
that we have made a positive sample selection bias in favour of women4, and only 
the most qualified have survive to unemployment.  
 
3 In the secondary education variable is included the vocational studies, focused in specific 
subject, more devoted to the labour market.  
4 Notice that in Spain the women unemployment rate is twice that of men. Usually, women have 
alternated temporary contracts and unemployment periods and then only the most qualified women 
have been in employment during the six years of our sample. See Escriche, Olcina and Sanchez 
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2.1 The variables 
We have estimated three Random Effect Probit model to study the 
differences, in terms of temporality, between people younger than 46 and people 
older than 45 years old.  The dependent variable used for estimation is TC, 
temporary contracts, that takes value 1 when the individual has a temporary 
contract, 0 if the contract is permanent. 
The independent variables are: 
Age: 
Age1: This variable takes value 1 if the individual is from 16 to 24 years old and 0 
otherwise. 
Age2: This variable takes value 1 if the individual is from 25 to 45 years old and 0 
otherwise. 
Age3: This variable takes value 1 if the individual is from 46 to 55 years old and 0 
otherwise. 
Age4: This variable takes value 1 if the individual is from 56 and more years old 
and 0 otherwise. 
Gender:
Women: This variable takes value 1 if the individual is a woman and 0 if it is a 
man. 
Marriage: 
Married: This variable takes value 1 if the individual is married and 0 otherwise. 
Income:
(2004) for a good theoretical framework about gender discrimination and intergenerational 
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9
Wage: The monthly net wage.  
Number of workers of the firm: 
Less than 50 workers: This variable takes value 1 if the individual works for a 
firm with less than 50 workers and 0 otherwise. 
From 51 to 100: This variable takes value 1 if the individual works for a firm 
from 51 to 100 workers and 0 otherwise. 
From 101 to 499: This variable takes value 1 if the individual works for a firm 
from 101 to 499 workers and 0 otherwise. 
More than 500: This variable takes value 1 if the individual works for a firm with 
more than 500 workers and 0 otherwise. 
Education Classification: 
Primary: Takes value 1 if the individual has primary education and zero 
otherwise. 
Secondary 1st cycle: Takes value 1 if the individual has the first level of 
secondary education and vocational and zero otherwise, this education is 
obligatory. 
Secondary 2nd cycle: Takes value 1 if the individual has the second level of 
secondary education and vocational and zero otherwise. 
University: Takes value 1 if the individual has completed university education 
(three or five years) and zero otherwise. 
 
transmission of preferences. 
Page 9 of 24
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
10
Industrial Sector Classification: 
 
Fishing and agriculture: Takes value 1 if the individual works in this sector of 
activity and zero otherwise.  
Extractives industries: Takes value 1 if the individual works in this sector of 
activity and zero otherwise. 
Food, drinking and tobacco: Takes value 1 if the individual works in this sector 
of activity and zero otherwise. 
Textile, clothing and leather: Takes value 1 if the individual works in this sector 
of activity and zero otherwise. 
Wood and paper except furniture: Takes value 1 if the individual works in this 
sector of activity and zero otherwise. 
Chemical product, couch and plastic, non-metallic mineral products: Takes 
value 1 if the individual works in this sector of activity and zero otherwise. 
Metallurgy; fabricated metal products, industrial equipment: Takes value 1 if 
the individual works in this sector of activity and zero otherwise. 
Manufacturing of electronic material, office machinery: Takes value 1 if the 
individual works in this sector of activity and zero otherwise. 
Construction: Takes value 1 if the individual works in this sector of activity and 
zero otherwise. 
Retail industry: Takes value 1 if the individual works in this sector of activity 
and zero otherwise.  
Page 10 of 24
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
11
Hotels: Takes value 1 if the individual works in this sector of activity and zero 
otherwise. 
Transportation, telecommunications: Takes value 1 if the individual works in 
this sector of activity and zero otherwise. 
Financial management: Takes value 1 if the individual works in this sector of 
activity and zero otherwise. This is the category of reference.  
Real state activities: Takes value 1 if the individual works in this sector of 
activity and zero otherwise. 
Government administration: Takes value 1 if the individual works in this sector 
of activity and zero otherwise. 
Education: Takes value 1 if the individual works in this sector of activity and 
zero otherwise. 
Sanity service: Takes value 1 if the individual works in this sector of activity and 
zero otherwise. 
Other social activities: Takes value 1 if the individual works in this sector of 
activity and zero otherwise 
 
Private Sector: This variable takes value 1 if the individual works in the private 
sector zero otherwise. 
Language: Takes value 1 if the individual needs a foreign language in its job and 
zero otherwise. 
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3. The discussion of results 
 
Here we will analyse the results obtained by the estimation of three 
samples. Firstly, we will explain the results of the whole sample (Table 2), and 
secondly, we will make a sample selection to analyse separately the results 
obtained for individuals younger than 46 and older than 45 years old (Table 3).  
The tables with the results of the estimated coefficients appear in the Appendix. 
The variables used for estimation have been described in section 2. 
 
3.1. The whole sample 
We have estimated a balanced random effect Probit model to study the 
determinants of temporary contracts. In Table 2 of Appendix, we present the 
results. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes value one if the 
individual has a temporary contract, zero if the contract is permanent. 
The age is a variable that affects the probability of been temporal. To be 
younger than 46 years old increases this probability with respect to be older. 
There are not significant differences between men and women in temporality.  
In addition, to be married reduces the probability of temporality with 
respect other situations as single or divorced.  
As higher is the monthly net wage, smaller is the probability of 
temporality. Even though we have a significant coefficient, the impact of this 
variable is very small because its value vanishes to zero.  
To belong to a firm with more than 500 workers reduces the probability of 
temporality with respect to a firm from 101 to 499 workers.  
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The result, in terms of education, indicates that individuals with secondary 
or university education do not seem to make difference with respect individuals 
with primary education. When we analyse this sample with population from 16 to 
65 years old of stable workers, the education level does not present significant 
differences in the probability of obtaining a permanent contract. This result 
reinforces the finding that temporary contracts have been used for all type of jobs. 
Therefore, in Spain, in the last twenty years, the most part of job creation have 
been oriented to “bad” jobs. Consequently, the Spanish productivity has been one 
of the lowest of the European Union.  
To work in sectors as chemical products, metallurgy, construction, hotels 
and transportation increases the probability of temporality with respect the 
financial management sector; while to work in sectors as real states activities, 
textile and clothing, fishing and agriculture or education do not present significant 
differences with respect to work in the financial management sector.  
We have obtained significant differences before and after the reform of 
1997. The probability of temporality augment in 1995 compared with 1997, which 
is the year of the second labour market reform and is the category of reference. 
However, we do not found significant differences between the year 1998 and 
1997, while in the years 1999 and 2000 the probability of temporality decreases 
with respect 1997. 
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3.2. The restricted samples 
In this section, we will compare the results obtained from the estimation of 
two samples corresponding to individuals younger than 46 and older than 45, 
shown in Table 3.  
 As we have mentioned previously, temporality affects essentially young 
people. We have obtained that the probability of temporality, for younger than 25, 
is larger than for workers older than 24 years old.  
When the sample is restricted to individuals younger than 46 to be women 
reduce the probability of been in a temporary contract. In Spain to persist in a job 
is difficult for women. So, in this selection we have the most qualified women as 
we have analysed in previous section. In fact, the percentage of university studies 
is higher for women than for men. In addition, we have to remark that since 1994 
there have been some fiscal incentives to promote the transition of temporary to 
permanent people for some population groups and females being among these.  
As higher is the monthly net wage lesser is the probability of temporality. 
This result is related with the Spanish labour market segmentation between 
“good” and “bad” jobs. In fact, one third of workers are under very flexible 
employment contracts with low wages and low severance payment and two-thirds 
are under permanent employment contracts with high wages and very high 
employment protection. 
For individuals with university degree the probability of been temporal is 
higher than for people with primary education, for the sample of younger than 46 
years old. Casquel and Cunyat (2004) have developed a matching model built on 
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Blanchard and Landier (2002) and Wasmer (1999). They have obtained, that for 
some type of workers “high productivity workers” temporary jobs act as stepping 
stones to permanent jobs, whereas other type of workers “low productivity 
workers” get stuck in temporary jobs. However, we have obtained, in a 
framework of stables workers, that people with university education get stuck in 
temporality. Even more, the percentage of conversion from temporary to 
permanent contracts is higher for workers with other levels of education below to 
that of university. 
As we have mentioned in previous sections, after 1994, the new jobs’ 
creation were essentially temporal. This restriction, have forced young individuals 
to start in the labour market with a temporary contract. The young people are 
more educated than older, usually with permanent contract because they came 
from other type of labour market regulation. In this context firms could choose the 
best workers from a pool of workers than exceed firm’s labour demand. This type 
of policy has generated serious consequences on productivity, and, consequently, 
has reduced incentives for education in the long run.  
The probability of temporality increases for jobs that belong to the 
industrial sectors of Fishing and Agriculture, Chemical products, Building and 
Hotels with respect to the management sector, for both samples. However only for 
the sample of workers younger than 46 to work in sectors as Food and drinking, 
Metallurgy, manufacturing and Government augment the probability of 
temporality with respect the management sector. The reform of 1997 has reduced 
the share of temporary jobs in private sector, but such a reduction was partially 
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offset by an increase of the share in the public sector. The reasons are related to 
fiscal consolidation and to the implementation of active labour market policies 
that affects especially young workers that are the new entrants in the labour 
market.  
Finally, when we analyse the effect of the labour market reform of 1997 
we observe that it was effective in the sample of younger than 46 while for people 
older than 45 years old there are not significant differences. This result reinforce 
our previous idea that young workers were the more affected by the change in 
labour market regulation. They were the most damaged by the use and abuse of 
temporary contracts and after the 1997 labour market’ reform, they have been 
benefited by the restriction imposed by law and, overall, by the introduction of a 
new permanent contract. In any case, the reduction in temporality measured 
around 2 or 3% has questioned the efficacy of these labour market reforms. We 
have to point out that the temporality rate in Spain in 2006 is still around the 30%. 
This result together with that obtained for the sectors of activity, show the 
segmentation of the Spanish labour market. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
Temporary contracts have been used in Spain as a way to enter in the 
labour market. Therefore, as the old permanent contracts coexist together with 
those temporary modified after the reform of 1984, we have found that older and 
less educated individuals are more probable to have a permanent contract than 
young people, which are on average more educated. 
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From a panel of working people with an age ranged from 16 to 65 years 
old, the gender does not affect to the probability of been temporal. However when 
we restrict the sample to individuals younger than 46 years old, to be women 
reduces the probability of temporality with respect to be men. Our selection 
implies a sample of young workers that are employed during six years without 
interruption. In Spain to persist in a job is difficult for women. So in this selection 
we have the most qualified women. In fact the percentage of university studies is 
higher for young women than for young men. In this sense we could conclude that 
is more difficult for Spanish women to obtain a job and also to keep it, than to 
obtain a permanent contract. 
We have shown that the probability of temporality in Government 
increases with respect to the financial management sector for young people. After 
the 1997 labour market reform the temporality share augments in the public 
sector. This policy affects mostly the new entrants in the labour market that were 
predominantly young people.  
Our results have shown that temporary contracts have been used in Spain 
for jobs and in sectors where the long run relations were important to enhance 
productivity. Now we need a more balanced situation to avoid the disincentives of 
a high rate of temporality in young entrants in the labour market. 
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6. Appendix: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Random Effects 
Probit Model 
 
TABLE 2: RANDOM EFFECT PROBIT MODEL OF TEMPORALITY (1995-2000) 
Variable Coefficient T-Value Mean of variable 
Constant -0.9933 * -3.831   
Age of individuals the category of reference is Age 3 (46-55) years. 
 
Age1 (16-24) 1.388 *     5.399   0.0125 
Age2 (25-45) 0.6915 *     5.233    0.6390 
Age4 (more than 55) -0.0758 -0.426 0.0738 
 
Gender the category of reference is woman 
 
Woman -0.1548     -1.054    0.2170 
 
Marriage the category of reference is not married (single, divorced.) 
 
Married -0.2889 *  -2.865 0.7499 
 
Monthly net wage  
 
Wage -0.00009* -3.831    195527.97 
 
Average number of workers by firm, the category of reference is from 101 to 499. 
 
Less than 50 -0.467 -0.475 0.4672 
From 51 to 100 0.0968  0.802 0.0949 
More than 500 -0.3174* -2.281 0.1793 
 
Education, the category of reference is EDU1: Primary education. 
 
Secondary 1º cicle 0.0316 0.259 0.2853 
Secondary 2º cycle -0.1509 -0.936 0.2139 
University level 0.3611 1.833 0.2382 
 
Industrial sector classification, the category of reference is Sec13 (Financial Management) 
 
Fishing and agriculture 0.4321 1.799 0.0322 
Extractive industries 0.3956 1.266 0.0263 
Food, drinking… 0.3964 1.498 0.0377 
Textile, clothing…. 0.4363 1.159 0.0161 
Wood and paper… 0.1027 0.283 0.0292 
Chemical products 0.7816* 3.093 0.0418 
Metallurgy… 0.6469* 2.738 0.0567 
Manufacturing… 0.1462 0.610 0.0494 
Building… 1.780* 8.963 0.0895 
Retail industry 0.3893 1.814 0.0957 
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Hotels… 0.8143* 3.102 0.0399 
Transportation… 0.4658* 2.013 0.0656 
Real state activities -0.3648 -0.943 0.0602 
Government  0.3331 1.421 0.0538 
Education -0.2060 -0.974 0.1306 
Sanity  0.0068 0.023 0.0578 
Other social activities 0.1325 0.655 0.0843 
 
Private Sector, the category of reference is public sector. 
 
Private Sector -0.1606 -0.118 0.6852 
 
Time, the category of reference is 1997 (the year of the second labour market reform). 
 
1995 0.3639* 3.665 0.1667 
1996 0.2023 1.806 0.1667 
1998 -0.0817 -0.721 0.1667 
1999 -0.4197* -3.584 0.1667 
2000 -0.3371* -3.414 0.1667 
 
Language, category of reference does not need foreign language in the job. 
 
Foreign Language -0.0303 -0.193 0.0947 
 
Rho 0.6285* 24.465  
 
Statistics 
 
N 1267 individuals 7602 observations 
Log likelihood function -1864.075 
Restricted log likelihood -2247.634 
Chi-squared  767.1174 
Note: the coefficient with * are significant at one percent. 
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TABLE 3: RANDOM EFFECT PROBIT MODEL OF TEMPORALITY (1995-2000) 
Variable YOUNGER THAN 46 OLDER THAN 45 
Coefficient T-Value Mean Coefficient 
 
T-Value Mean 
Constant      -0.0107 -0.045  -0.3655 -0.815  
Age of individuals the: category of reference is Age 2 (25-45) years old for younger than 46. 
 For older than 45 the category of reference is age 3 (46-55). 
 
Age1 (16-24) 0.8293* 2.536 0.0222 ---------- ---------- ---------- 
Age4 (more than 56) ---------- ---------- ---------- 0.0092 0.074 0.2807 
 
Gender: the category of reference is man. 
 
Woman -0.3334* -3.372 0.2273 0.2236 1.289 0.1951 
 
Marriage the category of reference is not married (single, divorced.) 
 
Married -0.5441* -6.580 0.7022 0.1920 0.917 0.8173 
 
Monthly net wage  
 
Wage -0.0001* -12.850 180989.65 -0.0001* -5.261 208211.68
Average number of workers by firm, the category of reference is from 101 to 499. 
 
Less than 50 0.0475 0.5138 0.5054 -0.1852 -1.003 0.4559 
From 51 to 100 0.0870 0.1211 0.0893 0.2182 0.704 0.0915 
More than 500 -0.1178 -0.709 0.1579 -0.4854 -1.017 0.1952 
 
Education, the category of reference is EDU1: Primary education. 
 
Secondary 1º cycle 0.0796 0.811 0.3413 -0.2198 -1.201 0.1751 
Secondary 2º cycle -0.0487 -0.372 0.2480 0.1980 0.853 0.0955 
University level 0.6037* 3.779 0.2445 -0.0501 -0.146 0.2237 
 
Industrial sector classification, the category of reference is Sec13 (Financial Management) 
 
Fishing and agriculture 0.7313* 3.091 0.0309 0.6375* 2.970 0.0405 
Extractive industries 0.3682 1.167 0.0295 -5.782 0.001 0.0185 
Food, drinking… 0.7465* 2.837 0.0389 -0.2435 -0.453 0.0455 
Textile, clothing…. 0.4468 1.525 0.0159 0.6202* 2.046 0.0145 
Wood and paper… 0.5194 1.462 0.0236 -0.1878 -0.330 0.0370 
Chemical products 1.0113* 4.003 0.0321 0.6814* 2.854 0.0610 
Metallurgy… 0.7725* 3.229 0.0539 0.6642 1.747 0.0580 
Manufacturing… 0.5275* 2.024 0.0445 -0.2384 -0.436 0.0455 
Building… 2.040* 10.082 0.0895 1.5227* 7.584 0.0905 
Retail industry 0.5908* 2.953 0.1148 0.2276 0.724 0.0680 
Hotels… 0.6862* 2.810 0.0473 1.0202* 4.078 0.0285 
Transportation… 0.5245* 2.465 0.0682 0.3938 1.194 0.0620 
Real state activities 0.0226 0.0643 0.0635 -6.295 0.000 0.0435 
Government  0.5524* 2.367 0.0496 -0.0057 -0.015 0.0560 
Education -0.0986 -0.4665 0.1303 0.2793 0.942 0.1401 
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Sanity  0.3969 1.4403 0.0468 -0.0800 -0.0118 0.0665 
Other social activities 0.4627* 2.2850 0.0888 -0.3461 -0.751 0.0790 
 
Private Sector, the category of reference is public sector. 
 
Private Sector -0.1658 -1.380 0.6875 0.6040 1.379 0.6806 
 
Time, the category of reference is 1997(the year of the second labour market reform). 
 
1995 0.3521* 3.403 0.1667 0.0071 0.025 0.1667 
1996 0.2187** 1.931 0.1667 -0.516 -0.157 0.1667 
1998 -0.0385 -0.3147 0.1667 0.0063 0.020 0.1667 
1999 -0.3882* -3.124 0.1667 -0.2509 -0.654 0.1667 
2000 -0.2551* -2.095 0.1667 -0.5412 -1.529 0.1667 
 
Language, category of reference does not need foreign language in the job. 
 
Foreign language 0.1399 1.138 0.1064 -7.615 0.000 0.0625 
 
Rho 0.4818* 15.271 0.0484 1.320   
 
N 711 individuals 333 individuals 
Log likelihood function -1378.094      -330.3227 
Restricted log likelihood -1432.274      -341.3601 
Chi-squared   308.3604      22.0746 
Note: the coefficient with * are significant at one percent, those with ** are 
significant at five percent. 
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